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Abstract 
The Paris Agreement would not have come into being had China, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU), 
which together contribute more than half of all global greenhouse gas emissions, not signaled their intent to take major 
steps to reduce their domestic emissions. The EU has been at the forefront of global climate change measures for years 
having issued binding domestic emission reduction targets for 2020 and 2030. For many years, China refused to an-
nounce a target date for when it might begin reducing its greenhouse gas emissions, and the US Congress blocked ac-
tion on climate change.  In the lead up to the Paris climate negotiations, however, there were major shifts in China’s 
and the US’s climate positions. This commentary examines the climate policies of the three largest emitters and the fac-
tors motivating the positions they took in the Paris negotiations. Given that the commitments made in Paris are most 
likely insufficient to keep global temperature from rising 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, the commentary also consid-
ers what the likelihood is that these three major economies will strengthen their emission reduction targets in the near 
future. 
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1. Introduction 
The Paris Agreement marks the beginning of a new 
phase in international efforts to promote climate mitiga-
tion and adaptation. The agreement sets a goal of main-
taining the global temperature rise to below 2 °C above 
pre-industrial levels, and to strive for no more than 1.5 
°C. As of August 1, 2016, 162 Intended Nationally De-
termined Contributions (INDCs) had been submitted to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat (UNFCCC Secretariat, 
2016). As the countries of the European Union (EU) 
submit a joint INDC, this means that almost 200 coun-
tries have submitted pledges. Existing pledges do not, 
however, appear to go far enough to remain within the 
2 °C target. An assessment made by an international 
team of experts and published in the journal Nature es-
timates that the existing INDCs would most likely only 
keep temperature rises at between 2.6 °C and 3.1 °C by 
2100 (Rogelj et al., 2016).  
Although the global nature of the agreement is its 
hallmark, it would not have come into being had the 
three largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters not sig-
naled that they were prepared to take action. Com-
bined, China (30 percent), the US (15 percent), and the 
EU (EU-28) (10 percent)—contribute more than half of 
all global greenhouse gas emissions (PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency, 2015).  
Within a few weeks of each other between October 
and November 2014, the EU, the United States (US), 
and China each pledged to reduce their GHG emissions. 
Given the failure of previous attempts to forge a global 
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agreement acceptable to all three of these major emit-
ters, what led to their Paris commitments? Why were 
they able to find the politically feasible solutions (Un-
derdal, 1998) which had escaped them during the ne-
gotiations in Copenhagen?  
The Paris Agreement is both legally binding and 
voluntary. The agreement obliges all parties “to under-
take and communicate ambitious efforts” and to have 
these efforts represent “a progression over time”. It al-
so expects each signatory to “prepare, communicate 
and maintain successive nationally determined contri-
butions that it intends to achieve.” Every five years a 
nationally determined contribution is to be communi-
cated; a contribution may be adjusted “with a view to 
enhancing its level of ambition” (UNFCCC, 2015). Can 
such upward adjustments be expected from China, the 
EU, and the US? This question is quite critical as with-
out a strengthening of the reduction commitments 
made by the three largest emitters, it is doubtful that 
other countries could be persuaded to go farther than 
they agreed to in Paris. Further action will be needed if 
there is to be a realistic chance of maintaining global av-
erage temperature increases to within the 2 °C target.  
2. The European Union 
Over the past two decades the EU has been the most 
consistent in not only calling for the establishment of 
binding international climate agreements but in back-
ing these calls up with its own binding GHG emission 
reduction targets. It has exhibited a kind of unilateral 
leadership, “setting the pace for others to follow” (Un-
derdal, 1994, p. 183). For the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the 
EU committed to an 8 percent reduction in its GHG 
emissions compared with 1990 levels. A decade later, 
it committed to three goals to be met by 2020: a 20 
percent reduction in GHG levels (compared to 1990 
levels), obtaining 20 percent renewables in the ener-
gy consumption mix, and reducing energy consump-
tion with a 20 percent improvement in energy effi-
ciency (compared to projected levels) (European 
Commission, 2010).  
In October 2014, the EU announced its 2030 tar-
gets: a binding 40 percent GHG emissions reduction 
target (relative to 1990 levels), a renewable energy 
target of 27 percent and a minimum energy efficiency 
improvement of 27 percent. Unlike in 2008 when the 
EU announced its 2020 target, no agreement has been 
reached on how responsibility for achieving these tar-
gets on a country-by-country basis is to be determined.  
A variety of factors can explain why the EU has 
been at the forefront of global efforts to tackle climate 
change. One is the strong level of public concern with 
climate change. In a 2015 Eurobarometer poll, 91 per-
cent of respondents found climate change to be a seri-
ous or very serious problem (European Commission, 
2015). A second is strong concern about long-term en-
ergy security. European supplies of fossil fuels are lim-
ited. The EU is the world’s single largest energy im-
porter; it imported over 53 percent of the energy it 
consumed in 2013 (Eurostat, 2015). This is a factor be-
hind the establishment in 2015 of the Energy Union, an 
initiative to enhance coordination on energy policy 
among the EU Member States focusing on five policy 
areas: supply security, an integrated internal energy 
market, energy efficiency, climate change, and re-
search and innovation for low carbon technologies.  
Europe’s relative share of global GHG emissions at 
the time of the Paris negotiations (10 percent) was 
considerably less than it was at the time of the Kyoto 
negotiations (15 percent). Exerting soft power by ex-
ample (showing that a transition to a low carbon econ-
omy is possible), may be one of the best ways for Eu-
rope to continue to exert global leadership in this 
policy area as its relative international weight declines 
along with its declining emissions levels (Skodvin & An-
dresen, 2006)? The transition is viewed by many as a 
way of developing a more sustainable economy, stimu-
lating new industries and creating new jobs.  
Still, there are many barriers to overcome for a suc-
cessful energy transition. Path dependencies remain 
strong. The oil, coal, and gas industries exert consider-
able pressure on politicians. Environmental interests 
are also not equally strong across the EU. As renewa-
bles have grown in some parts of Europe, so too have 
efforts to block their progress especially in regions 
which feel threatened by their success.  
There are different views about the best road 
ahead for Europe. When the EU 2030 emission targets 
were being negotiated, Germany was pushing for rela-
tively ambitious climate targets. Poland resisted these 
efforts arguing that Europe was taking on too much of 
the global climate burden and that its coal-dominated 
economy would be threatened by the changes. Great 
Britain opposed the German push for a higher renewa-
bles target because of their ambitions to invest further 
in nuclear energy (Dehmer, 2014) although they did 
support Germany in calling for a more ambitious ener-
gy efficiency target. In the end, the EU settled on 40-
27-27 targets rather than higher targets wanted by the 
European Parliament and some more progressive 
member states. 
There is also the added challenge of the resurgence 
of nationalist and far right parties. Populism in Europe 
has been driven by public frustration with economic 
inequalities, fears stemming from globalization, and 
reactions to immigrants entering the EU from Eastern 
Europe and conflict ridden and economically chal-
lenged regions in the Middle East and Africa. Marie Le 
Pen’s National Front in France is now a political force 
to be reckoned with. The party is opposed to participa-
tion in the international climate agreement. David 
Cameron’s political gamble to hold a referendum on 
membership in the EU ended badly. Brexit will mean 
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the EU will lose one of its stronger supporters of cli-
mate action although British–EU cooperation on cli-
mate change is likely to continue in some form.  
To date, no effort sharing agreements have been 
reached among the member states to determine what 
a fair allocation of burden should be towards meeting 
the EU’s GHG and renewable energy targets. In this po-
litical environment, further strengthening of climate 
targets will be very difficult. EU leadership on climate 
in the future is likely to be more strongly dependent on 
developments in the US, China, and other emerging 
economies. 
3. The United States  
Although the William J. Clinton Administration signed 
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, George W. Bush aban-
doned the agreement in 2001. Upon entering office in 
2009, Barack Obama signaled his intentions to once 
again assume a US leadership role in the climate nego-
tiations. Two interconnected strategies have been pur-
sued. One has been gaining cooperation on action from 
China and India and the other has been targeting emis-
sions from automobiles and power plants domestically. 
Years of efforts to improve bilateral climate coop-
eration with China led to the joint press statement by 
China’s President Xi Jinping and President Obama in 
November 2014 in which they announced their 2030 
climate targets. Obama pledged that the US would cut 
its emissions by 26–28 percent below 2005 levels by 
2025, with a best effort to reduce by 28 percent. Presi-
dent Xi Jinping announced that China would peak its 
GHG emissions by around 2030 and if possible earlier, 
increase the non-fossil fuel share of energy to 20 per-
cent, lower the carbon intensity of the GDP by 60 to 65 
percent below 2005 levels by 2030 and expand forest 
coverage. This remarkable achievement, which helped 
to break a long standing deadlock in the international 
negotiations (Underdal, Hovi, Kallbekken, & Skodvin, 
2012), would not have been possible had both coun-
tries not shown that they were prepared to take seri-
ous steps to address their domestic GHG emissions. 
In order to show climate progress, the Obama ad-
ministration has had to find a way to work around 
Congressional opposition to climate action. It has done 
this through various executive actions. The Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) has mandated Federal 
Government facilities to cut their GHG emissions by 40 
percent compared to 2008 levels by 2025 and to ex-
pand the use of electricity from renewable sources. 
The EPA has issued a series of new fuel efficiency 
standards for automobiles and light- and heavy- vehi-
cles based on the US Clean Air Act. In 2013, the Presi-
dent’s Climate Action Plan (2013) was announced (Ex-
ecutive Office of the President, 2013). The plan 
outlined measures to cut carbon pollution to make it 
possible to meet the “voluntary” pledge to cut emis-
sions Obama made in Copenhagen (to reduce US GHG 
emissions by 17 percent of 2005 levels by 2025) and 
paved the path for the establishment of the Clean 
Power Plan. The Clean Power Plan is the single most 
important element of the Obama administration’s cli-
mate strategy. It aims to cut CO2 emissions from power 
plants by 32 percent by 2030 (EPA, 2015a).  
The Obama administration moreover worked to 
shape the Paris Agreement in such a way that it would 
not require ratification by the Senate. The Obama ad-
ministration’s position is that the legally binding as-
pects of the agreement are already covered by earlier 
agreements (like the UNFCCC) which the Senate has al-
ready ratified and thus, do not require renewed ap-
proval. The INDCs are non-binding, aspirational targets, 
and thus, as interpreted by the Obama administration, 
do not need Congressional approval.  
While Obama’s climate initiatives have been wel-
comed by environmentalists, they have been attacked 
by conservatives. Republican Senator James Inhofe, 
Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee, well-known for his climate skepticism, has 
challenged the Obama administration’s position stating 
in a press release: “Despite this administration’s des-
perate effort to demonstrate an international agree-
ment on climate change, the announcement of a final 
climate deal from Paris is no more significant to the US 
than the Kyoto Protocol announcement 18 years 
ago….This agreement is no more binding than any oth-
er ‘agreement’ from any Conference of the Parties over 
the last 21 years” (Inhofe, 2015). Republican Presiden-
tial candidate Donald Trump has vowed to pull the US 
out of the climate agreement if he is elected. In con-
trast, Democratic Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton 
has signaled her intentions to continue with and even 
strengthen US climate actions. 
Beyond Obama’s climate initiatives, it should be 
noted that some emissions reductions are due to 
changes in the fuel mix. The 2005 Energy Policy Act, a 
signature achievement of Vice President Dick Cheney, 
eased restrictions on fossil fuel extraction on federal 
lands. One consequence of the policy was that it eased 
permitting for unconventional oil and gas drilling, also 
known as fracking. Cheap oil and gas have led to a dis-
placement of coal and a concomitant reduction in GHG 
emissions due to the lower carbon content of gas rela-
tive to coal. Thus, whereas US GHG emissions were ris-
ing through 2007, they have since declined quite dra-
matically. Emissions in 2013 were 5.9 percent higher 
than 1990 levels, far less than at their peak in 2007 
when they were 17 percent higher (EPA, 2015b). These 
emission reductions should not, however, be consid-
ered sustainable as eventually, these natural gas re-
serves will be depleted.  
The success of the Obama administration’s climate 
initiatives and the potential to eventually strengthen 
the US GHG reduction target will depend heavily on the 
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outcome of the 2016 presidential and Congressional 
elections and court rulings on Obama’s use of execu-
tive orders. 
4. China 
In China’s view, the main historical responsibility for ris-
ing GHG emissions lies with the US, Europe, Japan, and 
other rich countries. China has for many years resisted 
pleas by the international community for it to cap its 
rapidly rising emissions and has instead argued that de-
veloped countries have to do more to reduce their emis-
sions and to assist developing countries financially and 
technologically with climate mitigation and adaptation.  
In 2009 in Copenhagen, China announced that it 
was not prepared to take on an emissions reduction 
commitment, but it would reduce its energy intensity 
by 40 to 45 percent of 2005 levels by 2020, expand its 
use of non-fossil fuels to about 15 percent, and in-
crease forest cover by 40 million hectares. China’s an-
nouncement in the lead-up to the Paris negotiations 
that it was now prepared to peak its emissions around 
2030 is thus a significant break with the past. What is 
behind China’s change in position? 
To an extent international pressure is a factor. Chi-
na became the world’s largest GHG emitter, surpassing 
US emission levels in 2006. This makes it increasingly 
difficult to shift exclusive blame for climate change to 
the West. It has also become more difficult to use per 
capita emission differentials to argue for exceptions for 
China. In 2012, per capita GHG emissions in China (7.1 
tons) were still well below those in the US (16.4 tons) 
but they were basically the same as the EU average (7.4 
tons) (PBL Netherlands Environmental Agency, 2013).  
There is also a growing desire in China to be recog-
nized as an international power. That China together 
with the US and the EU set the tone for the Paris nego-
tiations has strong symbolic power.  
Still more than international pressure, domestic 
factors have shaped China’s changing stance on climate 
action. China is experiencing severe pollution problems 
and growing civil dissatisfaction with pollution levels. 
Air pollution has reached crisis levels largely because of 
the dramatic growth in automobiles, continued heavy 
reliance on coal (down from about 76 percent in 1990 
but still at about 63 percent in 2013) and the growing 
demand for oil.  
As is the case in the EU, China is concerned about 
long-term energy security having become a net energy 
importer. With a population that is not expected to 
peak until around 2025 at about 1.41 billion (Fu, 2015) 
and an economic growth rate that although slowing is 
still at between 6 and 7 percent per annum, China’s 
appetite for energy will remain robust.  
China thus has strong incentives to promote alter-
native sources of energy and energy efficiency. Gov-
ernment leaders also see considerable innovation po-
tential linked to the greening of the economy and the 
development and export of green technologies and can 
use support of a green economy as an argument in fa-
vor of modernization and the shutting down of ineffi-
cient industries, which otherwise would be politically 
more challenging.  
These various factors have contributed to China’s 
leadership’s decision to introduce a series of increas-
ingly ambitious environmental laws and programs. In 
March 2014, Premier Li Keqang declared war against 
pollution. A program to reduce emissions from the top 
10,000 largest carbon dioxide emitters was included in 
the 12th Five Year Plan. China introduced seven pilot 
regional carbon emissions trading schemes and will 
launch its national carbon emissions trading scheme in 
2017 (Chen & Reklev, 2014). As of 2014, China was in-
vesting more in renewable energy than any other 
country in the world and also had the largest amount 
of installed capacity (Ren21, 2015). The 13th Five Year 
Plan issued in early 2016 includes measures intended 
to help China implement its 2030 climate, energy effi-
ciency, and fuel switching targets. 
5. Conclusion 
Assessments suggest that the INDCs which countries 
have proposed for the Paris Agreement do not add up 
to what it will take to maintain global temperature in-
creases below 2 °C. The political situation in the EU and 
the US will make it challenging but not impossible to 
strengthen their climate action commitments in the 
coming period. China may be best positioned to further 
strengthen its climate targets assuming that its political 
situation does not destabilize. That China announced it 
would cap its emissions by 2030 or earlier, suggests 
that the leadership may believe that an earlier peak is 
possible. If the population peaks in 2025, this too 
would increase the likelihood that emissions could 
begin to decline around this time, assuming energy ef-
ficiency improvements continue.  
If China were to step up to take a stronger leader-
ship role on climate and make an early announcement 
of plans to move up the date by when it plans to peak 
and then begin to reduce its GHG emissions, it would 
weaken the arguments of populists in the West that ma-
jor transition countries are not doing their fair share.  
At the same time, the EU and the US will have to 
work to convince skeptics of the benefits of early ac-
tion. Frontrunners on both sides of the Atlantic have 
already done much to show the benefits that can be 
achieved from pursuing low carbon energy transitions. 
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